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THE FAKE TRIAL
DENNIS E. CURTIS*
The Senate Judiciary Committee's handling of the charges by Anita
Hill against Clarence Thomas had a more than superficial resemblance to
a criminal proceeding. At first, there even seemed to be a grand jury-
the Senate as a whole-taking evidence to determine whether there was
probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. That body
ended up with a decision to authorize a delay and to hold over the vote
on Thomas until a "hearing" on the charges could take place.
Then there was a "petit jury," close in size to the traditional body of
twelve, composed of the fourteen white men who make up the Senate
Judiciary Committee. This body looked like a jury, and made noises that
its job was to get to the bottom of the accusation. There were witnesses:
the accused (Clarence Thomas), the accuser (Anita Hill), corroborating
witnesses for the accuser, and character witnesses for the accused. There
were "defense" lawyers, Senators Hatch and Specter (taken from the
ranks of the "jurors," to be sure, but no less aggressive for that) who
attacked the credibility of Anita Hill and of the witnesses who testified
on her behalf. Another ofthe "jurors," Senator Biden, played the part of
"judge" or at least a quasi-judge, who ruled on objections, appeared to
set the ground rules, and kept the proceedings moving. One might have
remarked upon the absence of a traditional prosecutor, but two other
members of the ''jury,'' Senators Heflin and Leahy, had been designated
to ask questions of the accused, and did so, albeit gingerly.
But despite the outward appearances, what was going on was noth-
ing like a trial. The Senate as "grand jury" did not deliberate as a secret
body. (If it had, it might well have ignored the charges.) Further, the
Senate never really had before it any definition of an offense that was
supposed to be considered with specificity; no elements were spelled out.
Had that body wanted to make reference to the law on sexual harass-
ment, the Senate might have learned about the quantum of proof neces-
sary to sustain a complaint; for instance that the EEOC requires neither
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corroboration of an incident nor proof of a contemporaneous complaint
in sexual harassment cases.1
Similarly, the Judiciary Committee as "jury" did not stay in role.
Jurors do not typically ask questions, and they don't take on the jobs of
lawyers and judges. Most importantly, jurors are not supposed to have
personal stakes riding on outcomes. But the "Thomas jury" was com-
posed of senators like Biden, trying desperately to look fair, and senators
like Specter, trying to appease the right wing of the Republican party for
his heresy in voting against the confirmation of Robert Bork. Moreover,
the ''jury'' obviously saw itself as having the responsibility not only to
hear evidence and decide on liability, but also to "sentence" by deciding
what to recommend that the full Senate should do with the nomination
of Clarence Thomas.2
Despite the surface appearances, the absence of clearly-defined pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys further deprived the proceedings of real
similarities to trials as fact-finding instruments. Two of Clarence
Thomas's supporters on the Committee functioned as "defense" lawyers
for him and aggressively assailed the credibility of Hill's statements-and
then cast their votes for acquittal in their roles as ''jurors.'' The two
designated hitters for the "prosecution" were afraid to swing for the
fences. They were clearly uncomfortable in their roles, perhaps afraid of
seeming to be less than deferential to an almost-Supreme Court justice,
and certainly nervous when Thomas played his race card, comparing the
"hearing" to a lynching.3
Finally, this was a trial without a real "judge." Senator Biden,
ostensibly the "judge," had none of a judge's power. He could not really
decide on the law, keep out irrelevant evidence, instruct the jury, or take
a verdict. Further, the "judge" had been in charge when the Committee
had initially decided not to pursue an "investigation" of Anita Hill's
charges. Thus, "Judge Biden" had a personal stake. His reputation for
1. EEOC CoMPLIANCE MANuAL 3270 ("While a party's complaint or protest is helpful to
charging party's case, it is not a necessary element of the claim."), 3272 ("The Commission recog-
nizes that sexual conduct may be private and unacknowledged, with no eyewitnesses. • •• In appro-
priate cases, the Commission may make a finding of harassment based solely on the credibility of the
victim's allegation.") (March 19, 1990).
2. In the end, the Committee split 7-7, allowing the matter to go to the full Senate without a
recommendation. See, e.g., Timothy M. Phelps, Senate Begins Debate on Thomas, NEWSDAY, Oct.
4, 1991, at 17.
3. See, e.g., William Schneider, Not Much Really Changed on Thomas, NATIONAL J., Oct. 19,
1991, at 2578 (describing Thomas's characterization of the hearing as a "high-tech lynching for
uppity blacks"); Robert Shogan, Bush. GOP Viewed as Big Winners, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at
AS.
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competence as chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee was on the line.
As a result, all he could do was make bargains with members of the
Committee and then claim them as "governing principles" embedded in
legal tradition. Words like "burden of proof" were repeatedly invoked4
to protect Thomas while at the same time it was insisted that the inquiry
was not about any criminal or even civilly illegal behavior. In sum, the
television audience saw the trappings of a fact-finding proceeding-what
looked like a trial-but none of the basic elements of a real trial was
present.
The trial-like atmosphere was not only fake or disingenuous; it had
powerful, and harmful, effects that shifted the focus of the hearings in
important ways. First, the seeming procedural regularity and apparent
role definition camouflaged to some extent the intensely political nature
of the event. This is not to say that the participants and the audience
were unaware of the politics of the situation. The due process overtones,
however, offered a pretense of fairness that was easy to manipulate and to
exploit. Clarence Thomas's supporters were able both to characterize the
charges as "unfair"s and yet to demand strict procedural rules in the
name of fairness. His opponents were caught in their effort to maintain
an appearance of neutrality. Locked into their juror-judge roles, they
never really carried out any semblance of a genuine investigation of the
allegations. The confusion of roles and the effort to assume the mantle of
judicial fairness prevented the Senate from doing what it sometimes can
do, with varying degrees of success: investigate.
4. See. e.g., Melissa Healy & Edwin Chen, Thomas Confirmed, 52-48, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1991, at Al (quoting Senator DeConcini as saying during floor debate, "The burden of proof has to
be on the person who is making the accusation."); Ruth Marcus, When Roll Was Finally Colled,
Thomas Won Benefit ofDoubt, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at A19 (quoting Senator Dixon as saying
during floor debate, "Under our system, the burden [of proof] falls on those making allegations.");
David G. Savage, Thomas, Backers, Try To Make Him Seem Victim, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at
Al (quoting Senator Biden as saying to Judge Thomas at the hearing on Professor Hill's charges,
"The presumption [of innocence] remains with you, judge.").
5. See, e.g., Excerpts: "It's Decision Time and We Con't Punt", L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at
AS (quoting Senator Kassebaum as saying during floor debate, "In fact, I believe it would be mani-
festly unfair for the Senate to destroy a Supreme Court nominee on the basis of evidence that finally
boils down to the testimony of one person, however creditable, against his flat, unequivocal, and
equally creditable denial."); Paul Bedard, Bush Questions Timing of Charges Against Thomas,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at A6 (quoting President Bush as saying, "And they know it's unfair at
the last minute to have a charge like this leveled against a man that ... [has] been confirmed four
times by the Senate."); Juan Williams, Open Season on Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 10,
1991, at A23 (quoting Sen. DeConcini as saying of the charges against Thomas, "It is inconceivable,
it is unfair and I can't imagine anything more unfair to the man."); Martin Kasindorf & Jack Sirica,
Feminists Call Delay A Victory, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at 4 (quoting Senator D'Amato as calling
the charges "terribly unfair" to Thomas).
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In addition to influencing the way members of the Committee acted
(mostly postured) before the cameras, the trial-like atmosphere seemed
to have had a curious but real effect on how the participants thought
about what it was that they were doing. I believe that the focus on the
incidents of harassment alleged by Anita Hill drew the Committee's
attention away from the primary question that it had been facing-
whether Clarence Thomas should be confirmed in light of his entire rec-
ord-and toward the triple questions of whether the charges were true or
false, how to determine truth or falsity, and what to do if (Heaven forbid)
there was a finding that Clarence Hill had actually done what Anita Hill
said that he had done. The job of determining and dealing with what
happened between Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill looked quite differ-
ent from figuring out whether Thomas's record qualified him to sit on
our highest court.
Another troubling aspect of the attempt to put on a convincing
"trial" was that there was a palpable air of discomfort about "recalling"
this "jury." The case of Clarence Thomas was a case that this jury had
already heard. The Committee/jury had conducted a hearing, ques-
tioned the candidate, and heard from proponents and opponents about
Thomas's qualifications to sit on the Supreme Court. After the hearing,
the Committee had deadlocked at 7-7.6 Thereafter, enough Senators had
announced their intentions for the Committee to know that, had the vote
occurred before the Hill allegations, Thomas would likely have been con-
firmed by a vote of 54-46 at the very least.7 After Anita Hill's allega-
tions, the Committee/jury was being asked to revisit the case in light of
new information. And the new information looked like an allegation of
gross impropriety: perhaps actionable sexual harassment, perhaps a vio-
lation of the law.
In short, before October 7, the Committee, the Senate and the public
thought that Thomas "had" the nomination.g Thus, the question per-
ceived by the Committee/jury was not "did he do it?" or even "what
should be his sentence?" but rather whether or not, in light of the allega-
tions, Clarence Thomas should be deprived of something that he already
6. See supra note 2.
7. Neil A. Lewis, Law Professor Accuses Thomos Of Sexual Harassment in 1980's, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al ("At least 54 Senators have declared their intention to vote to confirm
Judge Thomas.").
8. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Support for Thomos Inches Toward Approval in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A16 (quoting Senator Metzenbaum, an opponent of the nomination, as
predicting only "a very slim chance that he')) be rejected" and noting that Thomas's principal sup-
porters predict sixty votes to confirm):
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possessed and hence was "entitled" to. The jurors knew that if there was
a finding of guilty, Clarence Thomas would'not be confirmed.9
It was knowledge of the punishment coupled with the knowledge of
the prior outcome that led, in my view, to a reluctance on the part of
Democratic Committee members to object to the pressured time-frame of
the Republicans or even to set up a procedure (such as appointment of
special counsel) that would have enabled both additional investigation
and serious cross-examination of Thomas. This view of the Committee's
sense of Thomas's entitlement meshes well with the general tenet that I
believe most politicians hold: that it is the province of the chief executive
to appoint whomever he or she wishes to judgeships, assuming basic min-
imal qualifications. To be sure, the Supreme Court is different, and over
the years some candidates have been defeated by the Senate, but the
underlying tendency to give the candidate the benefit of the doubt
remains. That tendency is supported by a view, rarely stated but widely
held, that such appointments are patronage to which elected executive
officials have a "natural" claim.
The reluctance of the Committee to take away from Thomas what it
thought he had sewn up played itself out in the language of the fake trial.
The so-called "evidentiary standard" that the Committee set for judging
his conduct toward Anita Hill was about entitlement. Chairman Biden,
as well as other members of the Committee, continually repeated that the
candidate "d~erved the benefit of the doubt."l0 The rhetorical effect of
9. In most cases, juries are not allowed to know what punishment will be imposed if a guilty
verdict is returned. The fear is that jurors will let their sympathies or prejUdices override their
judgment of guilt or innocence.
10. See. e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Confirms Thomas by 52 to 48 to Succeed Marshall on
Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al (quoting Senator Dole as saying during floor
debate, "Give [Thomas] the benefit of the doubt; he deserves that much."); Hearing of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 11, 1991 (quoting Senator Biden as beginning the
hearing by laying down the ground rules, among which is, "Judge Thomas must be given •.• the
benefit of the doubt."); Clifford Krauss, The Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at A18
(quoting Senator Biden as saying during a telephone interview, "I must start off with a presumption
of giving the person accused the benefit of the doubt."); David Lauter, Crucial Votes Seem Headed
Toward Thomas, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al (quoting Senator DeConcini as announcing he
will vote to confirm Thomas because "The 'Dennis' standard is that if there's a doubt, it goes to the
accused and not the accuser"); Senate Confirms Thomas to Join Court, U.S. L. WEEK, Oct. 16, 1991,
n.p. (quoting Senator Shelby during floor debate as saying, "Ifyou're going to give the benefit of the
doubt, you have to give it to Thomas in a case like this .•.."); Gaylord Shaw, Approaches Finale,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 1991, at 5 (quoting Senator Lieberman as saying in an interview on the Today
Show that Thomas deserves the benefit of the doubt); Thomas Narrowly Confirmed as l06th U.S.
Supreme Court Justice, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 17, 1991, at 769 Al (quoting
Senator Dixon, who backed Thomas because "[t]he accused gets the benefit of the doubt"). But see
Timothy M. Phelps, Justice Thomas, NEWSDAY, Oct. 16, 1991, at 3 (quoting Senator Byrd, voting
against Thomas's confirmation, as saying, "Give him the benefit of the doubt? He has no particular
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this "benefit of the doubt"-which made all of the difference in the case
of Clarence Thomas-was to obscure the realities of political patronage
and inter-party etiquette behind a facade of a seemingly procedurally fair
fact-finding proceeding, a fake trial.
The initial Thomas hearing, taken together with the Hill-Thomas
hearing, brings into sharp focus the relationship, or lack thereof, between
confirmation hearings and senatorial input into Supreme Court nomina-
tions. Clarence Thomas cannot be called an "outstanding choice"ll for
the Supreme Court. His qualifications, charitably put, are minimal. He
did not demonstrate during his initial hearing the breadth of knowledge
about, or even interest in, most of the Constitutional issues that he will
face. Indeed, he spent most of the hearing trying to distance himself
from views he had espoused in writings and in speeches before various
conservative groups, Moreover, Thomas did not exhibit judicial qualities
in the second phase of his confirmation process. Two examples will suf-
fice. The first is his suggestion that the charges and the hearing were
racially motivated,12 and the second is his charge that Anita Hill's
account had been fabricated for her by liberal interest groups.13 Neither
allegation can be supported by any evidence that surfaced during the
right to this seat ...." and noting that Senator Ford said he gave Thomas the benefit of the doubt
but voted against him anyway).
11. See, e.g., Linda P. Campbell, Jurist Shaped by Work Ethic, Racism, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 2,
1991, at lC (quoting Senator Danforth's reaction to the nomination: "I believe that he would be an
outstanding choice for the Supreme Court.")i Senators For: Resolving Uncertainties in Favor ofNom-
inee, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at A18 (quoting Senator Danforth as saying during floor debate, "I
believed on July 1st that [11lomas] was an outstanding choice, and 1 believe that even more today.").
12. See, e.g., Mitchell Locin & Christopher Drew, Defiant Thomas Attacks Panel, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 13, 1991, at lC (describing Thomas's characterization of the hearing as "a message that unless
you kowtow to an old order, this is what witl happen to you. You witt be lynched, destroyed,
caricatured by a committee of the u.s. Senate rather than hung from a tree."); Walter V. Robinson,
Thomas Says He'll Fight to the End, B. GLOBE, Oct. 13, 1991, at 1 (describing Thomas's accusation
that Hill used a sexual stereotype of black males to attack him). See also supra note 3 (quoting
Thomas's description of the hearing as a "high-tech lynching for uppity blacks").
13. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson, Thomas Says He'll Fight to the End, B. GLOBE, Oct. 13,
1991, at 1 (describing Senator Hatch's charges that Professor HitI's allegations were concocted by
"slick lawyers" in liberal interest groups); David G. Savage, News Analysis: Thomas, Backers Try to
Make Him Seem Victim, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at Al (same); David G. Savage, Some Ask How
Thomas Will Treat Opponents, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al (noting that Thomas accused liberal
interest groups, opposing senators and their staffs ofconspiring to "dig up dirt" about him); Thomas:
"This Plays Into the Most Bigoted, Racist Stereotypes", WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at A23 (quoting
Thomas as testifying, "Senator [Biden], 1 believe that someone, some interest group, 1 don't care
who it is, in combination came up with this story and used this process to destroy me..•. 1 believe
that in combination this story was developed or concocted to destroy me.").
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hearing, or that has surfaced since. The allegations themselves demon-
strate both a conspiratorial worldview and a readiness to lash out before
exercising judgment.
In parallel fashion, neither the Senate hearings on the nominations
of Anthony Kennedy nor David Souter shed much light on why either of
these two men should be confirmed as a justice of the Supreme Court.
After the Bork nomination failed, both men were coached to say as little
as possible, and both skated through without having to answer hard
questions either about judicial philosophy or about their views on the
paramount issues facing the Court.14
What is demonstrated by the recent nomination proceedings
(including Bork's) is that political patronage and power, rather than soft-
pitch inquiry into the quality and philosophy of a particular nominee,
determine the outcome. While hearings may provide justifications for
rejection, the underlying key has been political power: the votes to
oppose a presidential selection. To be fair, the hearings may have a
minor positive effect in that they give a level of visibility to a Supreme
Court nominee and so might, at least in theory, inspire that person to
perform on the Court in accordance with the values and constitutional
views that the nominee had publicly claimed. But this small virtue, if it
exists, cannot in my view legitimate a process that encourages the Senate
to duck its constitutional responsibilities.
The question is whether we should aspire to a Senate that does more
than occasionally balk, and then only for political reasons. If the Senate
should genuinely participate in Supreme Court nominations-which I
believe it should-then the Senate needs to be prepared to confront the
Executive and insist on exercising its veto power rather than bowing to a
presumption of presidential entitlement. This means that the Senate
should not be afraid to veto even nominees who are "highly qualified" by
American Bar Association standards, IS and should not be hesitant in
making known the names of those who, in its view, should be nominated.
The trial-like mode of confirmation hearings is at the root of the Senate's
failure, for the focus is on the individual nominee rather than on the
14. This is not to say that judicial candidates should have to predict how they will rule in
specific cases. On the other hand, the Senate should either require candidates to give some exposi-
tion of their current views, subject of course to change, or forget about the on-camera hearings in
which soft answers and polite evasions are the only fare.
15. The American Bar Association began rating Supreme Court nominees in 1955. Of the
twenty-three candidates rated since then, all except Clarence Thomas, Sand~aDay O'Connor (1981),
William H. Rehnquist (1971), and G. Harrold Carswell (1970) have received the highest rating.
Thomas: The Least Qualified Nominee So Far?, NATL L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 5.
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shape of the full Court. Instead of the ineffective questioning of individ-
ual candidates, the Senate should be committed to confirming a bench
that is sufficiently philosophically diverse so that genuine constitutional
debate can occur in the Supreme Court.
